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themselves. While the number and variety of the groups can be confusing, Peiss
focuses on the individuals—scholars
and librarians, male and female—who
had to make critical decisions about
books and collections out in the field.
Just as warfare sometimes is the
catalyst for great leaps in technology
and science, such as the development
of the rocket and jet engines during
World War II, Peiss contends that, in
addition to preserving physical books,
the LCM and other groups brought
about innovations in library science. The
sections on the use of microfilm and
the development of organizations that
would develop into ProQuest and OLIC
also were interesting to this scholar, who
uses those services on a daily basis.
Peiss also delves into parts of the
mission that were less than ethical. She
shows the shadowy actions of some
black-market dealers, as well as bringing
up the ethical dilemma of obtaining
a portion of a nation’s intellectual
heritage during a time of war. Finally,
I was taken by the discussion of saving
Nazi records and propaganda, first
for the war trials, then to preserve
them for future historical studies.
Peiss’s book is a joy to read; her recounting of this aspect of World War II is
interesting in itself. It also provides the
perfect companion piece to Robert Edsel’s
The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi
Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt
in History (2009) or Joshua Hammer’s
The Bad-Ass Librarians of Timbuktu:
And Their Race to Save the World’s Most
Precious Manuscripts (2016); the latter
deals with efforts to save important
manuscripts during a more recent war.
Peiss’s book deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone interested in intelligence
gathering, library science, the protection
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of cultural artifacts, or the power of
information warfare. I also would advocate that it be included in the training
of civil-affairs personnel in the military.
Peiss provides the history of efforts to
gather and preserve books, manuscripts,
and other sources, but she also provides
lessons on how to conduct similar operations during future military operations.
EDWARD SALO

Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval
Strategic Planning, by Steven T. Wills. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 292 pages.
$44.95.

In Strategy Shelved, Center for Naval
Analyses analyst and retired surface warfare officer Steve Wills examines the U.S.
Navy’s struggle to reestablish its purpose
and recapture its identity following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War. The “strategy shelved”
motif refers to both the late-1980s Maritime Strategy—perhaps the most successful employment and force-structure plan
in the Navy’s history—and the apparent
disinterest of the Navy’s leadership in
drafting a unifying strategic vision of
its future during the later 1990s and
the early part of the following decade.
In Wills’s depiction, the cadre of
uniformed naval strategists that the
naval services carefully developed
during the Cold War was shelved.
Instead, the Navy’s full attention turned
toward preserving its force structure and
its share of the dramatically shrinking
defense budget by grasping at stray
concepts and shoehorning itself into
land-centric joint plans. Under the latter
conditions, having creative strategic
experts did not seem particularly
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important, and many of the best bluesuited thinkers drifted to the Joint Staff,
where the “real strategy” was being
done in an “every service gets its equal
share” fashion. This trend obviously was
reinforced by the career requirements
imposed for joint qualification.
Wills’s book is primarily a history of
the drafting of a unifying naval service
strategy, from the late 1970s forerunners
to The Maritime Strategy through the
. . . From the Sea series of documents in
the 1991–97 period to the Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
(first version) of 2007. However, these
three eras hardly are treated equally;
the majority of pages are devoted to the
development of The Maritime Strategy,
a smaller but respectful number to . . .
From the Sea, and barely a handful to
the 2000s. But this is logical given Wills’s
construct, since much of his effort goes
toward explaining the effects of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, the land-centric
1991 Gulf War, and other currents affecting the transition from The Maritime
Strategy to . . . From the Sea, particularly
during the tenure of Admiral Frank
Kelso as Chief of Naval Operations.
The originality of Wills’s work is in
challenging the blue-water Navy’s
post-9/11 strategic-planning stupor,
which only recently is being dispelled
by the “shock” of the growing maritime
might of China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy. He does this by illustrating
the tremendous effort that the naval
leadership (including the Marine Corps)
and the most creative naval thinkers
poured into crafting, assessing, articulating, disseminating, and defending The
Maritime Strategy, in contrast to the
relative indifference displayed by their
successors. As Wills points out, the
Cold War–era Navy had a system for
developing very experienced strategic
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planners through sequential (repeated)
shore-duty tours in the strategy divisions
of the Navy Staff (OPNAV). Few were
the O-6 branch heads or the O-7 (and
above) division directors who had
not been previously a strategy-action
officer as an O-3/O-4/O-5 in those
same branches (or their equivalent
on the Joint Staff or fleet planning
staffs). Many had been sent to the most
challenging civilian graduate schools of
international relations or public policy
for their master’s degrees (and a handful
of PhDs). The Navy may still do that,
but not with the same intensity. These
officers were expected to be capable of
outreasoning the Navy’s academic and
think-tank critics. In contrast, a Navy
strategic-planning billet largely is seen
today as an isolated ticket punch.
Wills names names of almost all those
involved in drafting The Maritime
Strategy and the . . . From the Sea series.
Most circulated around OPNAV’s
Strategic Concepts Branch, then the hive
of strategy document production but
now no longer existent. Yet throughout
the book Wills stresses that it was always
the level of the CNO’s and SECNAV’s
personal commitment and routine
attention that determined whether a
dynamic and public naval strategic
vision would be created and would drive
programming, budgeting, and acquisition decisions, as well as the necessary
congressional and public support. Those
who might challenge the effect of strategy documents—with their “soaring,
elegant words”—on “deck plate” budgets
need to recall that The Maritime Strategy
originally was a classified document
to which all programming and Navy
war planning were directed to adhere;
the public version is but a fragment.
In addition to his pointing to the need
for direct, personal CNO and SECNAV
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involvement in the crafting of naval
strategy (whether classified or public),
Wills’s secondary and more subtle theme
is that the Navy cannot rely merely on
the homogenizing Joint Staff to “staff
and process” the Navy’s mission. Wills
does not go so far as to assert (as I
would) that—for all its discussion of the
future and support for unattainable programs—the Joint Staff is unable to shake
its (natural) fixation on the “wars (and
budget) we are in.” However, he makes it
obvious that naval control of the global
commons (which is the primary purpose
of navies) aroused no joint interest until
the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its growing antiaccess capabilities
and started pouring sand on reefs.
Overall, the history offered is accurate and the writing excellent. As
noted, Wills details the effects that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and Gulf War
had on the Navy’s strategic planning,

self-confidence, and sense of purpose.
These effects, plus the American
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq,
continue to ripple. Who needs a strong
Navy for wars of choice and attempted
nation building? And if you do not really
need a Navy—it having fallen victim
to its own Cold War success—why
would you need a naval strategy?
However, a new Cold War—and the
need to deter wars of necessity—is
coming upon us (or is already here). We
can approach our potential opponents
effectively only from a maritime axis
(which includes the air and the space
over the oceans). Perhaps this is the
time for national-security professionals
to determine whether there are lessons
to be learned from The Maritime
Strategy and its era. To do this, Strategy
Shelved is an essential reference.
SAM TANGREDI

OUR REVIEWERS

Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, Commander, USN, is an assistant professor of war studies and naval
history at the U.S. Naval Academy.
Jeffrey Bovarnick, a colonel in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, currently is serving
as executive officer to the Under Secretary of the Army.
Scott Cauble, Commander, USN, is assigned to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, where he serves as the Religious and Cultural Planner Chaplain.
Timothy J. Demy is a professor of military ethics at the Naval War College (the College).
Joshua Hammond, Commander, USN, is a professor of strategy and policy at the College.
James R. Holmes is a professor of strategy and policy at the College.
David A. Kohnen is a professor of leadership and ethics at the College.
Richard Norton, PhD, is a retired USN officer and a professor of national-security affairs at the
College.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

3

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 22

B O O K R E V I E WS

167

Edward Salo, PhD, is an associate professor of history and the associate director of the Heritage
Studies PhD program at Arkansas State University.
Viktor M. Stoll is a PhD candidate in history at the University of Cambridge and a U.S. Army
veteran.
Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of strategic and operational warfare in the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies at the College.
Donald J. Thieme is a professor of academics at the College.
Kathleen A. Walsh is a faculty member in the National Security Affairs Department at the College.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/22

4

